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1. Introduction 
The Nile river basin is a major resource for millions of people. It provides fresh water to 
densely populated area; it is the backbone to irrigation, particularly in the Egyptian farmland; 
and it is also a source of energy, through the delivery of hydroelectricity. Each of these 
functions imposes externalities of its own: building a dam upstream will have a direct impact 
on agricultural activities downstream. Appropriate arrangements are needed to coordinate 
these activities and monitor the alternative usages of a scarce resource.  
There is more to the story. The Nile river basin is 6,695 km long, making it the longest 
river system in the world, covering a huge territory. With its main tributaries, the White Nile 
and Blue Nile, it joins ten different countries in its network, with Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt 
its main beneficiaries, making it a strategic resource.  A major pollution event in Ethiopia will 
have a direct impact on Egyptian farmers or inhabitants in Cairo. Therefore, an efficient 
coordination has to be transnational. It means building a complex basin-wide institutional 
setting among countries with different interests and distinct political arrangements.2  
 The Nile case reveals problems that the water sector share with other infrastructures, 
with environmental issues, and with even more general concerns such as the distributional 
effect of reallocation of scarce resources.3 It also perfectly illustrates key issues in new 
institutional economics. (1) It explicitly refers to the now classical coasian example of 
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formally created in 1999 and that still remains to show its capacity to deal with the major problems raised by the 
international management of the basin.  
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3 
 
upstream externalities on downstream users. (2) With property and/or decision rights badly 
defined, or not defined at all, allocative as well as distributive effects can easily end up in 
conflicts, even violence. (3) Beside the economic transaction costs of finding appropriate 
ways to allocate and monitor a scarce resource among competing users, decision makers 
confront the political transaction costs of reaching and stabilizing an agreement among parties 
embedded in different institutional settings. (4) The efficient management of a scarce resource 
often requires societal changes to succeed, like accepting that water has an economic value.  
The point I want to make in this short note is that the research program and concepts 
developed by Coase, Williamson, North, Ostrom, among others, help framing and exploring 
these problems as well as finding solutions, or at least pointing out conditions that any 
solution must meet. The next section provides insights on the organizational dimension, 
which is too often neglected in debates about environmental innovation. Section 3 takes a 
look at the biggest picture of the institutional setting, which imposes constraints and/or 
facilitates transitions. Section 4 concludes on issues that should be high on our research 
agenda. 
 
2. Innovation viewed through organizational lenses.  
 A central lesson from the new institutional economics is that there are many different 
ways to deliver and monitor goods and services, and all solutions suffer from flaws. Because 
of these flaws, there is constant pressure to find innovative arrangements. Selection operates 
among these innovations because some organizational solutions fit better with the 
characteristics of the transactions at stake.  
Transactions cover more than the commercial transfer of private property rights. They 
encompass all transfer of rights among technologically separable activities. For example, 
rights over a common pool resource, say water, can be allocated with restrictions to farmers, 
4 
 
without giving them any property rights. Technological separability means that related 
activities can be unbundled, which is an essential condition to the delineation and 
transferability of rights. Once this condition is satisfied, transactions become possible under 
two conditions: (a) Whether private, public, or communal, rights must be defined and 
allocated; and (b) transfer of these rights requires the support of organizational as well as 
institutional devices. In a developed market economy, contracts typically do that, which 
explains their importance in organization theory and in so many debates about how to monitor 
environmental problems.  
Defining, allocating, and transferring rights, say rights to pollute, involve transaction 
costs. These costs vary according to the mode of organization chosen and its adequacy to the 
transactions at stake. Williamson (1985, chap. 2) has identified three main attributes 
determining these costs: the transaction-specific investments required; the uncertainty 
surrounding a transaction; and its frequency. As it is now well known from an extensive 
literature and innumerable tests, the first attribute is particularly significant. The more specific 
to a transaction the investments required, the more exposed parties are to contractual hazards, 
particularly opportunistic behavior, and the more safeguards they will want. Farmers will not 
invest in irrigation systems if they do not have significant guarantees of access to water and 
some control over transactions on the resulting output. 
In order to secure access to a resource, especially a scarce one, different organizational 
solutions are available or can be designed, although only a handful is usually feasible, either 
because of the characteristics of the transaction or because of institutional rules. For a long 
time, the literature has focused on the alternative between arranging transactions within an 
integrated entity, putting decision rights in the hands of a hierarchy, or using decentralized 
markets to perform this task. One can “make” or “buy” and the trade-off among these 
possibilities depends on the attributes identified above. To illustrate, the emission of CO2 can 
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be monitored through a ‘command-and-control’ approach by public authorities, as when a 
specific agency defines and implements standards; or public authorities can transfer to a 
market the job of allocating and regulating rights to pollute they have defined ex ante.  
A third mode of organization has recently attracted much attention, the so-called 
“hybrids.” These are arrangements in which parties maintain autonomous rights although they 
share some of them to jointly take advantage of existing assets or to create new assets. The 
resulting allocation of rights among partners, which may require the creation of an 
independent entity to monitor the venture and discipline parties, defines a complex and 
potentially innovative set of organizational solutions (Ménard, 2011). For example, the trade-
off above suggested that a farmer can irrigate her crop by acquiring a pump and connecting 
directly to ground water (“make”), or contract with an operator that will deliver the water he 
needs (“buy”), usually subject to regulatory constraints such as quotas on water pumped or 
delivered. However, there is an entire set of alternative solutions.  Our farmer might well join 
other farmers to collectively organize the usage and monitoring of the resource, with several 
possible arrangements (cooperative, joint venture, alliance, etc). Elinor Ostrom, who received 
the Nobel Prize in economics in 2009, has explored the advantages and difficulties of such 
collective actions (Ostrom, 2005).  
Acknowledging the existence of a host of organizational solutions opens room for 
innovative answers to old questions. When it comes to the delivery of public goods and 
services or the monitoring of environmental problems, the exploration of these possibilities 
remains remarkably poor.4 Most economists working on these issues have focused attention 
on one specific form, “public-private partnership” (PPPs). Let us assume that the water 
available to our farmer is polluted, threatening his health as well as that from the consumers 
of his products. Beside the traditional trade-off between a government strong enough to 
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impose new standards and organize directly the treatment of water (“to make”), and market-
oriented authorities creating tradable rights so that polluters will have to cover the costs of 
treatment (“to buy”), public authorities can outsource part of their decision rights, even some 
property rights, delegating to a private operator the provision and management of the scarce 
resource. This PPP solution, perceived as very innovative, although implemented in some 
countries for quite a while, has fired enthusiasm of many governments and international 
organizations since the mid 1990s, with mixed results.   
More radical innovations, like those favored by Ostrom who has exhibited the many 
successes of self-organized local communities, face skepticism among economists and policy 
makers, due to the problems of governance and free riding they raise as well as their difficult 
transfer to large communities.  However, a transaction cost approach suggests that none of 
these organizational answers should be discarded ex ante: trade-offs should be analyzed in a 
comparative way, with careful examination of the costs of implementing and monitoring these 
alternative modes of governance. This is a demanding research program, but hardly escapable 
if we want to go beyond expectations of technological miracles and look at innovative 
organizational solutions to environmental problems.   
Part of the difficulty in assessing the comparative costs and benefits of such alternatives 
comes out of the coordination problems raised when potentially conflicting rights over 
diverging usages are at stake. Farmers might organize a cooperative or rely on a communal 
arrangement rather than addressing a public agency or private operators to develop an 
efficient irrigation system; but they may have to deal with fishermen suffering from the 
depletion of water this system might induce, or with the authorities of a downstream city that 
depends on this resource. In that respect, all organizational solutions face problems of: (i) 
allocating property rights as well as decision rights as efficiently as possible; (ii) coordinating 
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parties on rights that complement or overlap; and (iii) enforcing the regulated usage of these 
rights. It also means that all solutions are institutionally embedded. 
 
3.  Institutional setting and societal transitions.  
 Let us face it: the analysis of institutions, their fundamental characteristics, and how 
they interact with organizational solutions to complex allocations of rights, remains in its 
infancy.  
Coase (1960) framed the ‘philosophy’ of the new institutionalists in that respect. 
Building on his contributions about the flaws inherent to all modes of organization, he pointed 
out that transaction costs plague the more general problem of the allocation of rights and their 
distributional effects, which are deeply embedded in institutional settings, for example the 
legal environment. Amazingly, all his examples have links with environmental issues.  
Extending Coase, Davis and North initiated a more systematic analysis of institutions, 
defined as “the set of political, social, and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for 
production, exchange, and distribution” (1972, p.6). Organizations as well as individuals are 
players within these rules, determined by laws, customs, traditions, or beliefs. The research 
agenda thus opened developed in two directions: one focusing on the identification of which 
institutions matter and how they operate, the other emphasizing forces at work in institutional 
changes and the related societal transitions.  
Four institutional components are of particular significance when it comes to 
establishing, allocating and monitoring rights: law, polity, administration, and ideology. The 
key role of legal regimes in shaping interactions among parties to a transaction is already well 
established, although the exact transmission mechanisms from laws to economic behavior 
remain relatively obscure. Laws play an important role in defining or confirming rights and 
the conditions of their transfer, for example rights to emit CO2 and how they can be traded. 
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Their implementation by an independent judiciary is central in making commitments credible 
and disciplining parties to an agreement. The lack, or weaknesses, of such institutions at the 
international level partially explain the difficulties in building and implementing 
environmental rules about problems by far exceeding specific jurisdictions.  
Such flaws also pave the way to political intervention. Numerous studies have 
documented the opportunistic behavior of governments in the definition and implementation 
of regulation, including environmental ones. However, the impact of the polity is more 
general and not only negative! The very nature of political regimes plays a role, for example 
in how externalities are monitored. The federal characteristics of the Australian system, with 
the significant rights devolved to states, made the negotiation ending in the Murray Darling 
Basin agreement particularly complex, with high political transactions costs but also strong 
commitment of all parties in fine. On the other hand, the cleaning of the Yellow river in China 
benefited from the decision capacities of a powerful central government, although it might 
also hamper the robustness of the agreement in the long run.    
A third institutional component too often neglected, or perceived negatively, concerns 
the administration. Bureaucrats play an important role in designing and implementing rules. 
Competent administrators and international experts were essential in making possible the Nile 
Basin Initiative, creating hopes that geostrategic tensions in the competing usages of water 
could be solved peacefully. The lack of adequate bureaucracy(ies) to implement the 
agreement is part of its fragility.  
Last, ideology, broadly understood as customs and beliefs shaping much of the 
strategies of actors to a transaction, is also part of the definition and possible solutions of 
environmental problems. In many reforms of water systems, beliefs that water is a gift of 
Mother Nature (or God) create powerful obstacles to metering, even when its purpose is not to 
support profitability but to make users responsible for their consumption of a scarce resource. 
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Changing perceptions of the impact of human action on our environment must parallel 
societal transitions if we want sound policies to be endorsed.  
This brings into the picture the dimension of institutional changes, which are very slow 
and result from the combination of complex forces. Technology plays its role. The revolution 
in information and communication technologies might have a direct impact on environmental 
policies. The wide diffusion of the Fukushima catastrophe is already changing dramatically 
the perception of millions of citizens and pushing the European Union towards coordination 
of security standards and joint regulation of nuclear plants. However, it also reveals how 
difficult actual changes are.  
In that respect, political transaction costs (North, 1990) can be a powerful instrument of 
changes … or paralysis. Think about the enforcement of regulation intending to curb 
pollution. For historical reasons, regulation are embedded in laws and determined within 
political regimes identified to Nation-States. When it comes to environmental issues, this 
level of decision making is often inadequate: problems may require solutions at local levels, 
to which general laws may be maladapted or that centralized systems oppose; or they are 
transnational, which requires coordination exceeding the domain of national authorities. The 
management of fisheries within the European Union or of the cleaning up of the Rhine 
illustrates the difficulties at stake. Crafting new institutions, for example a common policy or 
a basin agency, confronts the political transaction costs of reaching an agreement and the risk 
of multiplying layers of decision-makers, bloodsucking well-intentioned arrangements. The 
complex design of the Nile Basin Initiative shows how a complex institutional setting 
intended to coordinate usages with strong environmental impact might end up into continuous 
political bargaining, at risks of bursts of violence. Is institutional homogenization a solution in 
the long run, if at all feasible? That raises another issue: eliminating or reducing drastically 
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the diversity of institutional arrangements might confront problems similar to the reduction of 
variety in ecology. These are terrains that require much more exploration.     
 
4. Conclusion 
 This short essay suggests that the new institutional economics can provide powerful 
tools and useful insights in analyzing environmental problems and assessing potential 
answers. Three key concepts developed by NIE: property rights, contracts, and transaction 
costs, are particularly relevant in that respect, since they help understanding the intertwined 
role of organizational solutions and their institutional settings.  
 Indeed, when it comes to exploring environmental innovations, the emphasis on 
technological developments, for example the search for alternative sources of energy, too 
often ignores their embedment in organizational structures and the changes they may require. 
The development of green energy or smart grids may allow substantial reduction in energy 
consumption but may be conditional to a radically different approach to the organization 
needed. Shifting from a centralized network to decentralized provision might require dramatic 
changes in the allocation of rights, in decision-making process, and in coordination among 
parties. As shown by Ostrom for as different situations as the management of water, forest, or 
security, innovative organization, not technological innovation, is often the solution. 
However, the sustainability of alternative answers must be assessed in relation to the 
institutional context: what would be the transaction costs of an arrangement delegating the 
management of a common pool resource like the Nile basin to local communities and 
coordinating them?  
 Taking into account feasible allocation of rights, their distributional impact, and their 
costs remains a key element in determining if a technological innovation, or an organizational 
one, is economically viable and socially acceptable. It requires integrating the costs of societal 
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transitions. Switching the production of electricity from nuclear plants to renewable energies 
requires substantially different organizational arrangements, but also drastic changes in 
regulation, in pricing, etc., with distributional effects that cannot be ignored and with political 
transactions shaped and constrained by perceptions and beliefs that are integral part of the 
picture. An important lesson from the new institutional economics in that respect is that 
institutional answers are not the same everywhere5 and require the support of “micro-
institutions” deeply embedded in local traditions, customs, and beliefs. This also raises the 
challenging question of coordination at a more global level, which is inevitable when it comes 
to environmental issues. The design of innovative organizational arrangements is embedded 
in institutions and their adaptability. The problem is that they obey different tempo: their 
articulation determines acceptable transitions.  
 Exploring these questions defines a very demanding research program. One can hope 
that this journal will help filling the gap between what we know and what is needed. 
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